
# AGION REPORI



US MILITARY OPERATIONS
SS MAYAGUEZ/KAOH TANG ISLAND
12-15 MAY 1975

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## AFTER ACTION REPORT

#### SS MAYAGUEZ/KAOH TANG ISLAND OPERATION 12 - 15 MAY 1975

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TAB B INTELLIGENCE

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#### NARRATIVE SUMMARY

The following is a narrative summary of events beginning with report of the capture of the SS MAYAGUEZ by a Cambodian gunboat, and concluding with the extraction of the Marines from Kaoh Tang Island. All times used are Eastern Daylight Time (to convert to Gulf of Thailand time add eleven hours).

The incident became known in Washington at 0512 hours on 12 May 75 when the NMCC received a report from the American Embassy Jakarta that the SS MAYAGUEZ had possibly been boarded. At 0730 hours NMCC requested that a reconnaissance aircraft be launched from Utapao Airfield, Thailand, and at about 1000 hours, a P-3 took off to begin coverage of the area. By mid-afternoon other reconnaissance aircraft had been added and continuous surveillance was maintained until the end of the operation. First battle damage was incurred when a P-3 was hit by one round of small arms fire from a gunboat at 2116 hours. During the afternoon, the destroyer USS HOLT; the support ship USS VEGA, the USS CORAL SEA carrier task group, and the destroyer USS WILSON had been directed to proceed to the vicinity of Kompong Som from various locations in the Western Pacific. All of these ships were to play a significant role in the operations on 14-15 May. By midnight the MAYAGUEZ had moved from the vicinity of Poulo Wai Island to near Kaoh Tang Island.

On 13 May during the early morning hours, JCS directed CINC-PAC to maintain fighter/gunship cover over the MAYAGUEZ to effect release of the ship or to prevent her movement into port. At 0619 hours an A-7 reported placing ordnance in the water to signal the ship not to get underway. During the remainder of the morning, several small boats were observed moving to the MAYAGUEZ and between the ship and Kaoh Tang Island. It was concluded that the crew of the MAYAGUEZ was moved to the island during this time.

At 1210 hours, CINCPAC was directed by JCS to move all available USAF helicopters and a detachment of Security Police to Utapao, and to bring two reinforced Marine platoons from Cubi Point, Philippines to Utapao. During movement of the Security Police, a CH-53 crashed due to unknown causes, killing all 23 persons on board. At 1512 hours on 13 May, JCS directed CINCPAC to move a Marine Battalion from Okinawa to Utapao. All the above deployments were completed by 0300 hours on 14 May.





During the remainder of 13 May and into early evening of the 14th, efforts continued to prevent the MAYAGUEZ from getting underway until US forces could be positioned. Also, it was dur- 2000 ing this period, at 2020 hours, that an A-7 sank the first patrol boat of the operation while attempting to divert the craft. Authority to sink this boat had been given by the President eight minutes earlier. Shortly thereafter, a boat was seen leaving the island proceeding towards Kompong Som with a group of people in the bow. The pilot of the aircraft who made the sighting reported that these people were possibly caucasians. Unsuccessful attempts to turn back this boat including using riot control agents and firing across its bow; however, the It was not boat continued and subsequently entered the harbor. taken under direct attack because of the probability of Americans being aboard. One hour later, at midnight on the 13th, authority was given to attack and sink all small craft in the vicinity of Kaoh Tang.

Just before one o'clock on the morning of 14 May, CINCPAC and USSAG/7AF were tasked by the Acting Chairman, following an NSC meeting, to make preparations to seize the MAYAGUEZ, occupy Kaoh Tang Island, conduct B-52 strikes against the port of Kompong Som and Ream Airfield, sink all Cambodian small craft in target areas, and plan to also use tactical aircraft from the USS CORAL SEA. Preparations were to be completed in time for execution early on 15 May. The USSAG/7AF concept plan to conduct these operations was received in Washington at 1330 hours on 14 May operations was received in Washington at 1330 hours on 14 May operational concept is attached at Tab C and subsequent events followed this scenario closely, with tactical air from the USS CORAL SEA being substituted for B-52s in the attacks on the mainland.

The operation to effect the recovery of the SS MAYAGUEZ and crew from Cambodian control began with the military execute order issued after an NSC meeting at 1652 hours on 14 May, following extensive planning and prepositioning of forces. The initial order directed CINCPAC to seize and secure the MAYAGUEZ using Marines placed aboard the destroyer USS HOLT, and then to sail or tow the ship to sea as soon as possible. This order also directed a Marine helicopter assault on Kaoh Tang Island. Locations of the ship and island are as shown on Map, Tab C. Tactical air from Thailand and the carrier USS CORAL SEA was authorized to support the operations as required, as was the use of naval gunfire and riot control agents.





At 1714 hours on 14 May, the first helicopter took off from Utapao Airfield, Thailand, where all available USAF helicopters and the Marine Ground Security Force had been position-Tactical air began to launch from Thailand to provide continuous coverage for the operation and the airborne command post, flying over the Gulf of Thailand, assumed overall control at the onset. The first three helicopters carrying 48 Marine Ground Security Force combat troops, six Military Sealift Command personnel, six US Navy explosive ordnance disposal technicians, and a linguist arrived over the USS HOLT at 1858 hours, Personnel transfer to the HOLT was completed by 1922 hours. HOLT came alongside the MAYAGUEZ at 2045 hours, and 20 minutes later reported in full control of the ship. There were no personnel found on the MAYAGUEZ at the time of the boarding, but food found on the dining table and a warm kettle on the stove were evidence of a recent, hasty departure.

At 1710 hours, based on word passed from an NSC meeting in progress, JCS directed CINCPAC to commence cyclic strike operations from the USS CORAL SEA on the Kompong Som complex, with first time on target specified at 2045 hours to coincide with the estimated time of capture of the MAYAGUEZ. This estimate proved to be exceedingly accurate. The first cycle was to be armed reconnaissance with Cambodian aircraft and military watercraft as principal targets. Subsequent flights were to make maximum use of precision guided munitions to attack targets of military significance. The first cycle did not expend ordnance probably due to some uncertainty because of a temporary divert after becoming airborne and their inability to positively identify principal targets as Cambodian. The second cycle struck the Ream Airfield. The runway was cratered, several aircraft were destroyed or damaged, and the hangars were badly damaged. The third and final cycle struck the naval base at Ream damaging the barracks area and the Kompong Som port and POL refinery. Two warehouses were damaged in the port and a direct hit was scored on a large building in the marshalling yard. tial bomb damage assessment is preliminary, based on pilot reports and some photography, and may be refined as more information becomes available. Photographs of the target areas are included at Enclosure 4 to Tab D. Operations against the mainland terminated with final time on target of 0010 hours on 15 May.

The assault on Kaoh Tang Island (Photograph with Tab B) began at 1720 hours on 14 May with the take-off from Utapao of the first three of eight total USAF helicopters transporting Marine assault forces. At 1909 hours, one of the first helicopters in the area of the island reported hostile ground fire.





The flight mechanic was wounded and became the first casualty of the operation. A second helicopter was reported hit and burning in the water six minutes later. The third helicopter from this flight was reported crashed on the beach at 1945 Thirty minutes later insertion of the first assault wave had been completed. Of the eight helicopters in the first wave, three crashed on the beach or in the water and two were disabled, one landing on a Thai island for fuel before proceeding to Utapao and the other returning directly to Utapao. The Marine Ground Force Commander had secured his initial position at the northwestern landing zone by 2147 hours, and was receiving occasional automatic weapon fire and encountering claymore mine detonations. On the eastern landing zone, across the island from the main force, 22 personnel were isolated near the helicopter which had crashed on the beach. For photograph of the landing zones, see Enclosure 1 to Tab B.

At 2223 hours a boat was reported approaching the island flying a white flag. The destroyer USS WILSON picked up the occupants of the boat at 2305 hours. Shortly thereafter, it was reported that the entire crew of the MAYAGUEZ was accounted for aboard the WILSON and that all were in good condition. The fiveman Thai crew of the boat which brought the MAYAGUEZ crew to the WILSON from Kaoh Rong San Lem was provided food and fuel. By 0025 hours on 15 May, the MAYAGUEZ crew had been returned to their ship, and the ship was towed away from the island by the USS HOLT.

The initial assault wave had landed approximately 180 Marines on Kaoh Tang. Additional ground security forces had been requested by the commander on the island to provide reinforcement for a successful withdrawal or to continue offensive operations. The second Marine assault wave began to arrive in the area at about 2345 hours on 14 May. The helicopters received ground fire and one of the first two was damaged. At eight minutes past midnight, the Marines were reported in good position with the enemy forced back. At 0049 hours on 15 May the order was given to immediately cease all offensive operations and to disengage and withdraw all forces from the area as soon as possible consistent with safety/self defense. At 0121 hours, a helicopter from the second assault wave was hit at the island, and, along with two other helicopters, returned to Utapao without unloading Marines.

Initial efforts to withdraw forces from the island concentrated on extracting the 22 personnel in the vicinity of the downed helicopter on the beach, as this small force could have been rather easily overrun if left overnight. The helicopter making the attempt



was hit by ground fire at 0334 hours and recovered on the USS CORAL SEA. The main body of the Marine ground force, with a strength of approximately 213 personnel, had been unable to reach the downed helicopter or the 22-man Marine force, isolated on the opposite side of the island since approximately 1945 hours.

The extraction of the ground force was complicated by the reduction in numbers of helicopters operational (seven total of all types), the amount of enemy ground fire received by each inbound helicopter and the approach of darkness. Small boats from the USS HOLT and USS WILSON began efforts to assist in the withdrawal and approached the beaches at 0615 hours, but aborted due to ground fire. Working with naval gunfire and TACAIR support and with the ground force commander's recommendation that the extraction continue as necessary into darkness, helicopters recovering to the CORAL SEA were finally able to clear all USMC personnel from the island at 0917 hours, 15 May. Two hours earlier the small group near the downed helicopter had been the first extracted.

Latest reports indicate that there were 11 USMC, two USAF, and two USN killed in action, 41 USMC, seven USAF, and two USN wounded in action, and three USMC missing in action. The missing personnel are members of a Marine machine gun crew last seen during the final helicopter extraction from the northwestern landing zone, Kaoh Tang Island. Debriefing and investigation to determine final status of these MIAs are still being conducted.

At the approximate time of the extraction of the last Marines from Kaoh Tang Island, JCS directed that the residual force of 789 Marines at Utapao be retrograded from Thailand by daylight, 16 May (Bangkok time). The first C-141 aircraft with 150 Marines lifted off from the Utapao Airfield at 1156 hours with the last aircraft departing at 1710 hours, 15 May.

With the extraction of the last Marines from Kaoh Tang Island and the retrograde of the Marines from Thailand, the operation was successfully concluded. Reconnaissance sorties were continued until 17 May to provide bomb damage assessment and to search for the missing in action.





#### DIA INTELLIGENCE APPRAISAL

- l. Several islands off shore from the Cambodian mainland have been disputed by the Vietnamese and Cambodians over ownership for some time, particularly due to the possibility of oil deposits on the continental shelf. It appears that the Khmer Communists (KC) have decided to garrison these islands before the Vietnamese Communists focus their attention on them. Puolo Wai and Kaoh Tang Islands are two of these KC garrisoned locations.
- 2. Kaoh Tang Island (Encl 1), the suspected retention site of the SS MAYAGUEZ crew prior to initiation of Marine landing operations, is approximately 3 1/2 miles long and two miles wide at its greatest width. Two small islets lie about 1/2 mile off the east and south coast of the main island. The island is rock fringed with its highest point at its northern extremity. Two shallow coves press into the eastern and western neck of the island's northern plateau. The eastern cove has a long shallow coral sand beach excellent for helicopter landings. A near surface coral reef excludes vessels of any draft greater than 3-4 feet from reaching the beach.
- 3. No dwellings other than one or two small huts near the beach of the northeastern cove were identified prior to initiation of operations. Miscellaneous small fishing boats and navy patrol type craft were known to ply the waters between the islands and the mainland.
- 4. The following information was the best information available on the KC military situation in the area at the onset of the operation:
  - a. Khmer Communist 3rd Division directing operations in the coastal area; 1800-2000 troops.
  - b. KC units sent to small islands.
  - c. 150-200 KC possibly on Kaoh Tang; 82 mm mortars, 75 mm recoilless rifles, 30 caliber, 7.62 mm and 12.7 mm machine guns, B40/41 Rocket Propelled Grenade Launchers.
  - d. 1500-2000 KC vicinity Ream/Kompong Som.
  - e. Possible KC naval craft in coastal areas.

16-18 Swift Boats

- 1-3 Riverine patrol craft
  - 2 Landing craft utility
  - 4 Landing craft medium
- 1-177 Foot patrol craft

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f. Weapons mix on naval boats.

3 inch guns
20/40 mm anti-aircraft
50 cal./7.62 mm/l2.7 mm machine guns.


g. KC air defense capability.


Unknown number 23 mm/37 mm AAA weapons with 37 mm sites known at Ream Airfield.

- h. Small number T-28, AU-24, AC-47 and helo gunships with unknown operational status and location.
- i. Tactical Communications probably fair using residual US equipment provided to the former Marine Navy Khmer (MNK), and Forces Armee National Khmer (FANK).

#### 5. Post Operations Intelligence.

- a. The enemy force on the island is estimated at less than 200 troops, and armed with weapons indicated in paragraph 4c, above, with the addition of unknown types of antipersonnel mines. The KC had prepared defensive positions at key locations, especially with automatic weapons on the northern most high ground that commands the northeast and northwest coves and beaches.
- the KC suffered personnel casualties of 47 killed and 55 wounded in all strike areas. Included in this total were 10 dead boat pilots and an unknown number missing.
- c. Mainland bomb damage assessment (BDA) is presently being evaluated and portions of available photography are contained in Encl 4 to TAB D. BDA of sunken ships is also being evaluated with present probable losses in Encl 7 to TAB D.
- 6. Encl 2, SS MAYAGUEZ debrief.





#### DEBRIEF OF MAYAGUEZ CREW


The crew of the SS MAYAGUEZ was debriefed twice; once by US Navy personnel of the USS WILSON and once by the US Naval Attache, Singapore. Information presented in both debriefs is essentially the same and is outlined as follows:

- 12 May SS MAYAGUEZ challenged seven nm southwest of Poulo Wai Island by two PCF Swift boats; 50 cal machinegun fire across bow and down the sides. Boarded by seven armed men, none of whom spoke English.
- Ship's Master told to take the ship to Kompong Som; Master indicated he could not comply due to broken radar, remained anchored, night of 12 May near Poulo Wai.
- On 13 May, ship moved to vicinity Kaoh Tang Island, anchored and disembarked to Thai fishing boat and Khmer boat; US TACAIR arrived on the scene. Thai fishermen gave food and water to crew. English speaking Cambodian asked about ship's cargo and mission. At dark, Khmer took Master and several crewmen back to ship to check out locked rooms. On arrival, flares dropped by US aircraft caused Khmer to return group to boats.
- 14 May, Thai fishing boat with crew, preceded by two Khmer patrol craft, headed toward Kompong Som; patrol boats believed sunk by airstrikes. TACAIR placed gunfire across fishing boat bow and hit it with RCA but fishing boat with crew reached Kompong Som. Boat then proceeded to Koh Rong San Lem Island.
- Master convinced Cambodians that he could get US forces to stop bombing/strafing if ship and crew released.
- On 15 May at 0530 hours local (Golf) crew was put in Thai fishing boat to return to MAYAGUEZ and escorted to a point about one mile from Koh Rong Sam Lem Island and released. Crew put up white cloth on bamboo poles and continued movement until picked up by the USS WILSON at 0958 Local (Golf) and then returned to SS MAYAGUEZ.
- MAYAGUEZ under tow at 1540 hours Local (Golf) and under own power at 1648 hours local 15 May.
- Thai fishermen received food and water from the USS WILSON, diesel fuel from the USS HOLT and escorted out of the area to return to Thailand; fishermen reportedly held by the Cambodians for five months.

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- Ship's Captain states that Cambodian fear of airstrikes and prompt US force response were the primary causes for release of the ship and its crew.

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#### OPERATIONAL CONCEPT

Ref: Map attached.


1. MISSION: Seize the SS MAYAGUEZ and conduct military operations to influence the outcome of US initiatives to secure the release of the ship's crew.

#### 2. CONCEPT:

- a. Assault to begin at sunrise 15 May.
- b. Using three USAF helicopters, insert 48 marines, 12 USN/MSC personnel, an explosive ordnance team and a Cambodian linguist on the USS HOLT.
- c. Using eight USAF CH/HH-53 helicopters execute a combat assault on Kaoh Tang Island, with 175 marines in the initial wave and subsequent buildup to a total of 625 Marines on the island.
- d. USS HOLT, upon closure of Marine Security Force, conduct operation to seize the USS MAYAGUEZ and take action to remove the ship from the operational area.
- e. Marine assault force on Kaoh Tang Island secure the island and rescue members of the SS MAYAGUEZ that may be found there.
- f. Combat support.
  - (1) Destroyers USS WILSON and USS HOLT provide naval gunfire and search and rescue support.
  - (2) USAF TACAIR: A-7, F-4 and F-111 aircraft used during daylight and F-111/AC-130 aircraft used at night. Provide close air support for marine assault forces. Prevent movement of Cambodian small craft in the Kaoh Tang/Poulo Wai Island complex.
  - (3) USN TACAIR: A-6 and A-7 aircraft engage Cambodian shipping in designated area. Maintain continuous armed reconnaissance during daylight. Prepare to strike mainland targets, if directed.

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
- (4) B-52 force from Guam conduct conventional airstrikes against Ream Airfield, and ports of Kompong Som and Ream beginning approximately three hours after the assault on Kaoh Tang Island. As an alternate, USN TACAIR from the CORAL SEA instead of the B-52 force will strike designated mainland targets.
- (5) Search and Rescue: USAF HC-130 fixed wing and HH-53 helicopters respond as required.
- (6) On scene coordination: Airborne command and control center in an EC-130 aircraft provide continuous coverage.
- (7) Helicopters for assault force: CH/HH-53 helicopters shuttle marine force to Kaoh Tang Island from Utapao RTAFB, Thailand. (3.5-4 hour turn around time 1 hour 45 minutes flight one way).
- (8) Air refueling: SAC KC-135 tankers support USAF TACAIR requirements; HC-130s support HH-53 helicopters.
- (9) Weather reconnaissance, forward air controllers, flare support, flak suppression, escort, rescue cover, electronic warfare, electronic intelligence, air refueling, search and rescue and other support actions conducted as required.
- (10) Landing zone clearing using the BLU-82 (15,000 pound special purpose bomb) authorized, as required.
- g. Command and Control.
  - (1) Overall operational control of PACOM forces directed by CINCPAC as authorized by the JCS.
  - (2) CINCSAC exercises operational control of committed B-52 force for strikes that may be directed by JCS.
  - (3) COMUSSAG/7AF exercises on scene coordinating authority for supporting forces as directed by CINCPAC.



# SS MAYAGUEZ/KAOH TANG ISLAND OPERATION PERSONNEL CASUALTIES

The following is a summary of subject casualties reported by the Service Headquarters as of 1430 EDT 20 May 1975:

	KIA	MIA	WIA
USN	2	0	2
USMC	11	3	41
USAF	2	_0	
TOTALS	15	3	50



# HELICOPTER SORTIES LOST/DAMAGED

SERVICE	HELOS EMPLOYED	SORTIES	LOSS	DAMAGE	CAUSE
USAF*	7 CH-53	20 CH-53	3 CH-53	4 CH-53	Ground fire Kaoh Tang Island
	8 нн-53	32 HH-53		6 нн-53	,
USN	2 SH-3G	4		·	

USMC None

<sup>\*</sup> Does not include 8 CH-53 and 11 HH-53 deployment/redeployment sorties to and from Utapao nor CH-53 lost due to unknown causes during deployment.



#### TACAIR OPERATIONS FROM THAILAND

SERVICE	TYPE ACFT	SORTIES	TARGETS	LOSS/DAMAGE
USAF	F-4	164	Close air spt vic Kaoh Tang.	<pre>l damaged - hole in inlet ramp.</pre>
	A-7	44	Close air spt vic Kaoh Tang and RCA on MAYAGUEZ.	<pre>l damaged - hole in wing.</pre>
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •	F-111	45	Close air spt vic Kaoh Tang.	
·	AC-130	19	Close air spt vic Kaoh Tang.	
	C-130	6	1 BLU 82 droppe	ed.
	TOTAL	278		



# TACAIR OPERATIONS FROM CARRIER CORAL SEA AND BOMB DAMAGE ASSESSMENT, MAINLAND STRIKES

SERVICE	TYPE ACFT	SORTIES	TARGETS
USN	A-7	5*	REAM/KOMPONG SOM AIRFIELD
	A-6	2*	REAM/KOMPONG SOM AIRFIELD
	A-7	2*	REAM PORT/POL STORAGE
	A-7	4*	KOMPONG SOM PORT/POL FACILITY
,	A-6	2*	REAM PORT/POL STORAGE
	F-4	18	CAP/ESCORT
	A-6	4	CLOSE AIR SUPPORT KAOH TANG ISLAND
	A-7	10	CLOSE AIR SUPPORT KAOH TANG ISLAND
TOT	ral	47	

<sup>\*</sup> Results of airstrikes Cambodian mainland.

#### KOMPONG SOM PORT COMPLEX:

- Two warehouses damaged and fires noted
- POL refinery hit
- Railroad marshalling yard building hit, no fire or secondary explosions noted


#### REAM NAVAL BASE:


- Barracks destroyed; POL fires noted

#### REAM AIRFIELD:

- Numerous A/C destroyed, 5 A/C damaged Hangars damaged, runway cratered, large POL fire, active 37 mm AAA site damaged.







# SS MAYAGUEZ/KAOH TANG ISLAND OPERATION COMBAT SUPPORT AIRCRAFT OPERATIONS

SERVICE	TYPE	SORTIES	MISSION
	 ov-10	4	Forward Air Controller
USAF	EC-130	6	Airborne Command and Control Center
	нс-130	8	Search and Rescue Control and HH-53 Refuelers
	СН/НН-53	. 3	Search and Rescue
	KC-135	49	TACAIR Refuelers
	Sub Total	70	
USN	KA-6D	.6	Refueler
	KA-7D	2	Refueler
	E1-B	_4	Airborne Early Warning
	Sub Total	12	
·	Grand Total	82	

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## SS MAYAGUEZ/KAOH TANG ISLAND OPERATION

## RECONNAISSANCE SORTIES

					•		
	MAY	12th	<u>13th</u>	<u>14th</u>	<u>15th</u>	<u>16th</u>	Total
USAF		÷	,				
RF-4C		0	4	6	4	2	16
*U-2R		1	3	3	3	l,	11
RC-135		0	0	1	0	1	2
USN				•			
EP-3E		1	0	0	0	. 0	1
RF-8G	,	. 0	. 0	0	2	0	2
**P-3							18
<u>.</u> 3				-			50

<sup>\*</sup> Increased tasking from one/8-hr mission per day to 24-hr/day coverage for radio relay.

Excised Under the Provisions of (The Freedom of Information Act) 5USC552 (b)



<sup>\*\*</sup> Continuous surveillance of Gulf of Thailand throughout MAYAGUEZ incident.

# RESULTS OF ATTACKS AGAINST CAMBODIAN NAVAL VESSELS

Following is a recapitulation of the results of reported strikes on Cambodian naval vessels.

# Sinkings to Prevent Movement of SS MAYAGUEZ to Kompong Som

Date/Time of Incident (all times are EDT)	Struck by	Type Vessel	Results
132020 May 75	A-7	Patrol Boat	Sunk NE Kaoh Tang Island
140040 May 75	F-4	2 small boats	Sunk between MAYAGUEZ & Kaoh Tang Is.
141406 May 75	AC-130	Patrol craft	Sunk 2 miles ENE Kaoh Tang Island

# Sinkings to Protect USMC Forces on Kaoh Tang Island

			<b>,</b>
Date/Time of Incident	Struck by	Type Vessel	Results
150100 May 75	F-4	Large barge	Sunk North Kaoh Tang Is.
150140 May 75	A-7	Patrol craft	Sunk 6 miles south Kompong
150146 May 75	F-111	2 small boats	Sunk south Kaoh Tang Is.
150540 May 75	USS WILSON	Patrol boat	Sunk north Kaoh Tang Is.
	TOTAL	8 patrol craft barge sunk.	and one

## RETROGRADE OF US MARINES FROM THAILAND

It was directed that all USMC personnel be extracted from Thailand by daylight 16 May (Bangkok time). As a result, the Military Airlift Command, using C-141 aircraft, began outloading from Utapao RTAFB immediately after termination of combat operations. There were 789 Marines for transport to Kadena Airfield, Okinawa. The first aircraft departed Utapao at 1156 hours (EDT) 15 May and the last trooplift aircraft departed Utapao at 1710 hours (EDT) the last trooplift aircraft departed Utapao at 1710 hours (EDT) 15 May (approximately one and one half hours prior to Bangkok daylight) arriving Kadena at approximately 2225 hours (EDT) 15 May.

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
SS MAYAGUEZ/KAOH TANG ISLAND OPERATION

JCS LOG OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

(120512 EDT THRU 150920 EDT

MAY 1975)

TIME		EVENT
120512 EDT		US Embassy, Jakarta reports possible boarding of SS MAYAGUEZ. (Critic 0356)
120703 EDT		Deputy Director for Operations (DDO), National Military Command Center (NMCC) requested Pacific Command (PACOM) to launch reconnaissance (recce) aircraft from Utapao - Estimate time of launch 121000 EDT.
120957 EDT		PACOM reports that P-3 recce aircraft airborne (40 minutes to surveillance area).
121111 EDT		COMSEVENTHELT tasks USS HOLT and USS VEGA to proceed to search area.
121441 EDT		CINCPACFLT directs USS CORAL SEA and escorts (TG 77.5) to proceed to vicinity of Kompong Som and directs Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) (USS OKINAWA, DULUTH, BARBOUR COUNTY, MT. VERNON) to prepare to proceed to scene.
121546 EDT		JCS (msg) directs continuous P-3 surveillance and tracking of Cambodian naval units (observe 12 mile limit).
121829 EDT		TG 77.5 ETA Gulf of Thailand at 150300 EDT. USS WILSON underway with ETA of 142000 EDT.
122116 EDT	•	P-3 aircraft reports positive identification made of MAYAGUEZ - 09° 56N - 102° 58 E; two gunboats in vicinity - on 1000 yard pass P-3 was fired upon and took one hit in vertical stabilizer.
130225 EDT		SS MAYAGUEZ is dead in the water at 10° 20 N - 103° 09 E; surveillance aircraft received small arms fire (tracer) from SS MAYAGUEZ.
130617 EDT		Message confirming telecon between J-3/JCS/and J-3/CINCFAC: Directed to maintain constant TACAIR/gunship coverage of the MAYAGUEZ - authority granted to fire in vicinity of but not at small boats to prevent movement - authority granted to proceed within the 12 mile limit.
130619 ETD		A-7 placing ordnance in the water vicinity MAYAGUEZ as a signal not to get underway.



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TIME	EVENT
130642 EDT	Small boats approaching MAYAGUEZ from vicinity Kaoh Tang. F-lll directed to make a low pass to discourage or slow their movement.
130644 EDT	Small boats tied up to MAYAGUEZ. No reaction from people aboard the ship.
130705 EDT	Small boats departed MAYAGUEZ for Kaoh Tang; personnel appearing to be Caucasians sitting with heads on knees.
130716 EDT	Thai Prime Minister states that Thai position on retaliation is that it should be between the US and Cambodia and should not involve Thailand.
130753 EDT	Two small boats at Kaoh Tang Island are off loading people onto the island.
130845 EDT	MAYAGUEZ is still dead in the water. All personnel appear to still be on the island. Surveillance aircraft is drawing small arms fire from the island.
131021 - 131040	Two 50 foot patrol boats went to the MAYAGUEZ and then departed the ship; status of passengers unknown.
131041 EDT	USS HOLT directed to move to secure or disable the MAYAGUEZ upon arrival at the scene.
131200 EDT	JCS directed CINCPAC and USSAG/7AF that Kaoh Tang should be isolated by intercepting all boats. Action should be reported to JCS within 10 minutes of occurrence. Decision to sink boats resides in Washington. Directive result of NSC meeting.
131210 EDT	JCS execute message dispatched:
	- All available helicopters in Thailand to Utapao.

- Two marine platoons from Cubi Pt. to Utapao.
- Marine battalion at Okinawa placed in advance deployability posture.



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TIME	EVENT Off
131422 EDT	Reconnaissance aircraft observed personnel off loaded from MAYAGUEZ; TACAIR received ground fire from Kaoh Tang Island.
131512 EDT	JCS directs USMC battalion to move from Okinawa to Utapao via MAC airlift.
131705 EDT	Marine Battalion Landing Team (2d Battalion, 9th Marines) began movement to Utapao; estimated ————————————————————————————————————
132012 EDT	JCS relayed to CINCPAC and USSAG/7AF President's decision through SECDEF to sink a Cambodian patrol boat attempting to leave vicinity of the island.
132020 EDT	A-7 aircraft attempted to divert a Cambodian patrol boat; boat sunk with 10 survivors sighted in a raft.
132152 EDT	Fishing boat with possible Caucasians aboard spotted moving toward the mainland northeast of Kaoh Tang Island.
132255 EDT	TACAIR fired across bow of fishing boat and dropped riot control agents on the boat to divert or stop its movement; vessel continued its course.
132353 EDT	F-111 aircraft received antiaircraft fire from an island west of Kompong Som.
140005 EDT	Authority given from President through SECDEF to sink four boats at Island and another patrol boat which previously fled island and now moored at another island.
140006 EDT	JCS verbal authority given to sink small boats and advises caution in actions against craft next to the MAYAGUEZ or at Kaoh Tang Island.
140040 EDT	Two F-4 aircraft expended 2,000 rounds of 20 mm on small boats in cove; one secondary explosion. Two boats sunk.
140048 EDT	ACJCS debriefed CINCPAC and major subordinate commanders on the NSC meeting and provided planning guidance for military operations to recover the ship and crew as follows: At first light 15 May, US Force and crew as follows: At first light and simul
	and crew as follows: At IIIst IIght Island and simul will be prepared to secure Kaoh Tang Island and simul taneously board the MAYAGUEZ. Also plan for strikes against Kompong Som complex using B-52s from Guam and TACAIR from the USS CORAL SEA.





TIME	EVENT
140055 EDT /	JCS message confirms verbal authority to sink small boats (item 140006 EDT).
140520 EDT	CINCPACFLT directed USS HANCOCK to sail immediately with troops and helicopters for MAYAGUEZ operational area.
140952 EDT	AC-130 aircraft directed by on-scene commander to prevent any boat from approaching the MAYAGUEZ.
141406 EDT	AC-130 gunship sunk a patrol craft two miles east northeast of Kaoh Tang Island.
141421 EDT	USS HOLT standing by 25 nautical miles northwest of Kaoh Tang Island.
141442 EDT	P-3 aircraft directed to locate Swedish vessel HIRADO.
141645 EDT	NSC Meeting to JCS: Directed forces to begin operations to board MAYAGUEZ and make a helicopter assault on Kaoh Tang Island, but excluded air attacks on the Mainland of Cambodia.
141652 EDT	JCS gave verbal order to CINCPAC to initiate the operation - excluded mainland strikes.
141703 EDT	First flight of assault helicopters to depart Utapao at 1714 EDT - third flight of the first wave to depart at 1723. First three HH-53 (Jolly Green 11, 12, 13) to go to USS HOLT and the remaining five (Knife 21, 22, 23, 31, 32) to Kaoh Tang Island.
141710 EDT	NSC meeting to JCS: Directed cyclic strike operations from the USS CORAL SEA against targets in the Kompong Som Complex with first time-on target specified at 2045. Details of operational authorities and principal targets were included.
141710 EDT	JCS directed CINCPAC to commence cyclic strike operations against the Kompong Som Complex with the first time on target of 142045 EDT. First flight to be armed reconnaissance. Make use of guided munitions against targets of military
	significance.

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
TIME	EVENT	
141742 EDT	JCS msg confirms verbal execute of	order of 1652 EDT.
141845 EDT	Five flights of A-7 TACAIR launch area.	ned for operational
141858 EDT	Three HH-53s arrived over the US	S HOLT.
141909 EDT	Knife 22 (CH-53) received small landing zone (LZ); flight mechan	arms fire at the ic wounded.
141915 EDT	Knife 21 (CH-53) crashed into the north northwest of Kaoh Tang Isl	e water 1 nm and.
141922 EDT	Jolly Green 11 and 12 completed marines on the USS HOLT and proc SAR support for Knife 21 (crashe between Kaoh Tang Island and the	eeded to provide d in water
141930 EDT	Knife 22 reported to be losing f providing escort.	uel - Knife 23
141940 EDT	Knife 23 and 31 reported receivifire from the tree line vicinity LZ on the northeastern beach, Ka Knife 31 subsequently crashed an beach waterline and Knife 23 cra a short distance away from 31.	of the oh Tang Island. d burned on the
141946 EDT	Approximately 100 marines insert island; difficulty in forming up before reinforcement possible.	ed on the ; some hours
142028 EDT	White House Situation Room forwathat CORAL SEA aircraft are not ordnance on Kompong Som Harbor.	rds direction to release
142029 EDT	JCS informed CINCPAC not to use for strikes on Kompong Som Harbo	Navy TACAIR
142044 EDT	JCS directed CINCPAC to cease al strike operations from the CORAL	l cyclic SEA.
142045 EDT	USS HOLT drew alongside the MAYA	AGUEZ.
142047 EDT	White House Situation Room forward that the first wave from the COI continue mainland strike mission prior to additional strikes.	RAL SEA could
142048 EDT	JCS informed CINCPAC of instruction White House (142047 EDT).	tions from the

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TIME	White House provided instructions that CORAL SEA strikes should continue as planned; CINCPAC
142052 EDT	informed by JCS (NACC).
142105 EDT	full control of the range to be consolidated
142106 EDT	on the island; force until reinforced.
142110 EDT	MAYAGUEZ boarding party reports that no one was found aboard the ship.
142204 - 2215 EDT	Possible that two more cycles of seven helicopters would extend into the night; estimated departure of the second wave was 142300 EDT; ground force under heavy enemy fire and requesting naval gunfire from the USS HOLT.
142223 EDT	Boat flying a white flag reported to be approaching the island.
142236 EDT	Two tugs 60 miles from the MAYAGUEZ, enroute to pickup the ship and release marines for use on the island.
142250 EDT	Naval gunfire communications established with the ground force ashore.
142254 EDT	The boat with the white flag reported to contain caucasians. USS WILSON directed to secure the boat and its personnel.
142301 EDT	Time of CORAL SEA strike at Ream Airfield reported as 142257 EDT.
142314 EDT	Entire crew (40) of the MAYAGUEZ and five Thai fishermen secured and identified by the USS WILSON.
142316 EDT	Marine ground force directed to pull back so that CORAL SEA TACAIR can provide suppressive fires to cover withdrawal operations.
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	TIME	EVENT
	142341 EDT	Ground force on western objective area reported one KIA and eight WIA (three serious).
	142344 EDT	SECDEF informed the CJCS that the third wave from CORAL SEA should strike as planned.
	142344 EDT	CORAL SEA strike underway against the Kompong Som POL depot ordered to continue with all subsequent sorties devoted to close air support for the Marine force.
	150008 EDT	Marines reported to be in a good position and consolidating with opposition forced back.
	150010 EDT	SECDEF instructed the CJCS that efforts should be made to extract the Marines without further casualties.
•	150020 EDT	JCS advised CINCPAC that there was no commitment to keep the Marines on the island or capture it and request was made for extraction plan. Asked for recommendations for maintaining pressure on mainland targets.
	150038 EDT	SECDEF informed the CJCS to cancel the CORAL SEA's fourth wave attack against mainland targets.
	150040 EDT	B-52 alert cancelled. TACAIR to be used to cover marine withdrawal.
	150041 EDT	CORAL SEA instructed to move closer to the island and to act as recovery base for the helicopter extraction.
	150049 EDT	JCS directed CINCPAC to devote efforts to extract- ing Marines - no further consideration to additional mainland strikes.

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TIME	EVENT
150050 EDT	SECDEF directed cessation of all offensive operations and to completely disengage all forces.
150055 EDT	JCS message implemented item 150050 EDT.
150033 EDT	Under cover of TACAIR, Knife 51 and 52 (CH-53)
150140 EDT	A-7 aircraft attacked and sunk a patrol craft from which hostile fire was received.
150236 EDT	PAC informed NMCC that Knife 23 still had radio communication; one man aboard who could blow it up one man critically wounded, one with a head wound, two with leg wounds, and one dazed.
150244 EDT	USS WILSON destroyed hostile gun position in partially sunken gunboat vicinity of eastern LZ.
150254 EDT	Marine commander reported that he was ready for extraction using six helicopters; two into the LZ at one time.
150310 EDT	Reported to be 160 Marines on the northwestern LZ and 22 at the helicopter crash site on the eastern LZ.
150327 EDT	Extraction of Marine ground force to begin at 150530 EDT.
150348 EDT	Report states that there are 261 Marines to be evacuated - seven helicopter loads - can get only four loads out before darkness. (total number clarified at 150359 EDT as: 213 on the island and 48 aboard the USS HOLT).
150411 EDT	Night extraction under consideration.
150515 EDT	USS HOLT and USS WILSON to attempt to use boats to assist in extraction starting at 150615 EDT - helo extraction moved to 150630 EDT.
150649 EDT	Boats launched towards shore.
150712 EDT	Helicopter extracted 25 personnel from the site of the two crashed helicopters; enroute to the CORAL SEA.
150733 EDT	BLUE CHIP (COMUSSAG/7AF) indicated that Marines may have to remain overnight, discussing with ground commander.
150749 EDT	Based on ground commander's recommendation extraction is to be extended into the night.



150753 EDT

Reported that all personnel extracted from the

east side of the island.

EVENT

150917 EDT

Capt Davis, USMC extracted on the last helicopter, reported that he was relatively certain that all Marines were off the island.

COMUSSAG/7AF verified the final extraction from Kaoh Tang

Island by message at 150920 EDT.

#### GLOSSARY

Acting Chairman, Joint Chiefs of ACJCS Staff Configuration of naval vessels Amphhibious Ready Group primarily designed to support a Marine amphibious assault Attack aircraft A-6 Attack aircraft A-7Mission with primary purpose of Armed Reconnaissance locating and attacking targets of opportunity Bomb damage assessment BDA US Air Force bomber aircraft B-52 Radio call sign of USSAG Blue Chip Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Chairman Staff Commander-in-Chief Pacific Command CINCPAC Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff CJCS Commander, Seventh Fleet (Western COMSEVENTHFLT Pacific area) USS CORAL SEA Aircraft Carrier CORAL SEA Critical intelligence information CRITIC released by the National Security Agency with a FLASH precedence; may require attention of the NSC. Launch/recovery of operation of Cyclic carrier-based aircraft Deputy Director for Operations DDO DTG Date Time Group

Eastern Daylight Time

Estimated Time of Arrival

EDT

ETA

#### GLOSSARY continueá

ETD Estimated Time of Departure

F-111 Attack aircraft

J-3 Operations Directorate of a joint military staff

Kaoh Tang Island Also spelled Koh Tang Island

Landing Zone (LZ)

A specified location within an objective area used for the landing of aircraft; usually associated

with helicopters

Lift Transport by helicopter

NMCC National Military Command Center

NSC National Security Council

Ordnance Bombs, rockets, bullets, etc.

P-3 US Navy turboprop long range

patrol aircraft

POL Petroleum, oils, lubricants

PACOM Pacific Command

PACFLT Pacific Fleet (Euphemism for

Commander-in-Chief of)

Recce Reconnaissance

Riot Control Agents (RCA) Chemical agents used as a nondeadly means of crowd control

SAR Search and Rescue

SECDEF Secretary of Defense

Sortie An operational flight by one

aircraft

TACAIR Tactical aircraft (fighters, attack

aircraft)

## GLOSSARY continued

TOT

Telecon

USSAG

USS HOLT

USS VEGA

USS WILSON

Wave

Time-on-Target

Telephone conversation

United States Support Activities Group (Headquarters, Nakhon Phanom Royal Thai Air Force Base)

US Navy Destroyer

US Navy store ship (deliveries, provisions for at sea fleet elements)

US Navy Destroyer

A formation of forces (in this context a grouping of helicopters)

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF MESSAGE CENTER Act Pri -Info J32 VZCYCHAY485YLN391 C.D.N MULT EA RZ 427 ACTION OPS DISTR CJCS (04) CJCS (01) DJ8 (03) SJCS (321 J3 (13 Spyric JRC SECDEF (84) NHIC SECDEF: ASDITSA (IF) | ABDIPA(81) | OTALES HCCC CHC J3ZA CSAF HASH DC ADP CNO HASH DC Rents CSA WASH DC Flans EPAD FILE(1) [845] J33 EUMEAF 7.1C ADV DISTR NHCC - Link ave 1.2.3 TRANSIT/1523337/1523337/888183TOR1352332 DE RUHOHOA #2384 1382331 J3: ZNY CCCCC Z 132330Z MAY 75 G0::P PH CINCPAC HONOLULU HI EPLA TO PUHORSA/USSAS/7AF NAKHON PHANOM APRT TH Street RHHHBRA/CINCPACELT HAKALAPA HI J35/330 RUHVAAA/CINCPACAP HICKAH APB HI J33/ZS INFO RUEKJCS/JCS WASHINGTON DC 2::::: 67 La Tar CUMPIDENTIA L/J315/J3 BENDS : 11 520 HAYAGUEZ/KOH TANG OPERATIONS (C) YELECON 15/15432 MAY 75 CINCPAC/CINCPACAF/CINCPACFLT/COMUSSAG/ 7 45 TERMINATE ALL OPERATIONS IN SUPPORT OF RECOVERY SS HAYIGUEZ AND CREW. (U) THIS CONFIRMS REF A. BD8=8. #2384 ANNOTES CSB 951 CIUCPA S

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